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THE UN, CSCE, NATO AND WEU 
PEACEKEEPING COOPERATION 
Conferência proferida pelo autor por ocasião da X Conferência Anual 
sobre Estudos Estratégicos, organizada pela Missão dos EUA junto da NATO, 
subordinada ao tema genérico «NATO lN THE 1990's: MOVING FROM 
THEORY TO ACTlON» e que teve lugar em Knokke-Heist, na Bélgica, 
no período de 15 a 18 de Setembro de 1994. 
No capítulo intitulado «ACTIVIDADES PROMOVIDAS PELO IDN», 
da presente revista, são dados mais pormenores sobre a Conferência aqui 
referida. 
John O. B. Sewall 
THE UN, CSCE, NATO ANO WEU 
PEACEKEEPING COOPERATION 
1. lntroduction: «Peacekeeping cooperalioM among the UN, CSCE, 
NATO and WEU is too broad an area of analysis to cover in a brief paper 
without imposing some form of analytical framework and definitional clarity 
that can hopefully delimit the subject. With that in mind, I would first 
like to use the more inclusive term «peace operations» which include tradi-
!ional peacekeeping at the low end; peace operations that involve other 
civil-military activities such as monitoring elections, cantonment of equipment, 
delivery of humanitarian assistance and rebuilding civil institutions, in the 
middle; and peace-enforcement at the high end. Secondly, wc need to know 
a bit about the security structures themselves and how the peace operation 
pie is divided - in other words, who does what to whom. Then to the heart 
of the analysis, I will address what it is that these security structures should 
be cooperating about, and finally, with whom and how this cooperation is 
being handled. 
My thesis, in brief, is lhat the rhetoric is there, but the reality is noto 
A good analogy is any national defense budget where the declared defense 
program and anticipated capabilities are never quite matched by reality, 
due to subsequent budget reductions or perhaps initial under-funding 
- witness the United States' strategy of being able to execute !wO near1y 
simultaneous major regional contingencies. The promises quite frequent1y 
become illusory and stretch off into the distant future. The Ministerial 
Communiqués and institutional descriptions similar1y suggest a degree of 
cooperation in the peace operations which unfortunately does not exist as yet. 
The reasons are many, but in brief I would high1ight: 
a lingering lack of clarity as to the appropriate substance of coopera-
tion, 
167 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
weaknesses in instítutional structure, particularly with regard to the 
CSCE and WEU, 
unhelpuf competition among some institutional structures for a piece of 
the pie, e.g .• NATO and WEU, and 
a língering lack of consensus on roles and overall arehitecture. 
Coasequently, cooperation at the strategic and polítieal-milítary leveI 
remains fragmentary and weak, with perhaps the weakest links being 
between NATO and the UN and NATO and the CSCE. Conversely, eoope-
ratioa at the operational and taetieal leveIs - military to milítary - is reaso-
nably sound and improving. I speak here of NATO and the UN and NA TO 
and the WEU. 
2. Who does whal lo whom? This seetion of the paper does not pur-
port to be exhaustive in detail- there are many studies on the subject - but 
it wíll attempt to provide some headlines and shorthand to get us in the 
game. 
a. Uni/ed Natiom (UN): The UN is the world organization wíth a char-
ter covering peace operations, although «peacekeeping» as a terIU wíll not 
be found in the UN Charter itself. Nonetheless, the UN Charter and more 
reeenlly Seeretary-General Boulros Boulros-Gali's report, An Agenda for Peace, 
deseribe various measures appropriale for lhe «Pacifie Seltlemenl of Disputes» 
(Chapter VI in lhe UN Charter), eomprising prevenlive diplomacy, preven-
tive deployments, peaeemaking, peaeekeeping and peaee-building. The lore 
of knowledge and experienee relaling to Il'adilional peacekeeping is well 
known, as is the conlribution of cerlain nations in terms of participatíon in 
UN peaeekeeping operations and relaled nalional training establishments. I 
note in particular the Nordie counlries and Canada, although I could add 
speeífic Asian and Afriean countries as well. 
Chapter VII of the UN Charler relates to «Aclion with respecl lo 
threals to the peace, breaches of the peace and acls of aggression.» This is 
lhe chapler which authorizes taking «action - as may be necessary to main-
taln or restore international peace and security» - that is, interventíon using 
coercive military force to achieve polítical objectives. UN Chapler VII opera-
tions may be eíther UN - authorized throug a United Nations Security 
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Couneil Resolution, examples being Korea and the Persian Gul War, or 
UN - directed «<blue bere!») as recentll' seen in UNO SOM II. 
The principal UN meehanisms relating to peaee operations are: 
the Seeurity Counei! which deve10ps the mandate or authorizing UN 
Seeurity Counei! Resolution; 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) whieh provides 
military advice to the Seeretarl'-General and the Seeurity Counei! 
and doctrine and training guidanee to nations. DPKO also plans and 
eonduets peaee operations on behalf of the Seeurity Counei!; 
the Milit81')1 Staff Committec, eurrentll' moribund, whieh potentially 
could provide milit81')1 advice to the Security Counei! anel strategie 
direction for UN peace operations; 
national troop eontributions which eomprise the land, sea and air 
units executing the mandate. 
A hrief assessment of the UN with regard to peaee operations would 
suggest that it, first, suffers from overreach. the result of an explosion in 
peace operation commitments, now eomprising 18 field operations with 
some 70 + thousand troops in the field and eosting in the order of $3.5 hillion 
a year, second, it is in lhe procoss of improving its planning capability, field 
management and 10gistic support, but is not there l'et; third, it has not 
stood up to lhe plate in providing appropriate doctrinal guidance nor resol-
ving the conceptual problem of UN - direeted «peace-enforcement» opera-
tions in eonditions of near-anarehl', yet short of total war; and fOUlih, its record 
thus far in an operational context is that it is adequate1y structured to manage 
UN - directed peace-keeping operations, but not for UN - direeted peace 
enforeement. 
h. The Conferen.ce on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): 
The CSCE, involving 53 states, is a politicaI eonsu1tative process, a forum, 
not at pl'esent an international organization with treaty status. 
Nonethe\ess, following the 1990 CSCE Paris Surmnit, institutionaliza-
tion of the «proeess» began and more recentll' the 1992 Helsinki Summit 
Decl.ration reflected agreement on developing a strueture for earll' warning, 
conflict prevention and erisis management. ln addition, the 1992 Helsinki 
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Declaration recognized the NATO offer of peacekeeping support included in 
the 1992 Oslo North Atlantic Counci! (NAC) Communiqué. Subsequently 
at the 1994 Alliance Summit in Brussel, NATO committed itself to SUppOI'-
ting «the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for 
carIy waming, conflict prevention, and erisis management». 
CSCE mechanisms most involved with peace operations include: 
the Committee of Senior Offieials (CSO), which reviews current 
issues, prepares the work for and carries out the decisions of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers, 
the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, 
the Permanent Committee, the first permanent body for politicaI 
consultation and deeision-making, and 
official fact-finding, monitoring and sanctions assistance missions. 
A brief assessment of the CSCE with regard to peace operations would 
suggest lhat first, it still suffers from lack of structure, i.e., institutionaliza-
tion; second, although considered a legitimate regional organization as des-
cribed in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it is best suited for Chapter VI 
paeific settlement of disputes through fact finding, conflict prevention and 
limited peacekeeping; and third, with no forces and little structure, it is 
ill suited for erisis management ar peace-enforcement missions. 
c. Nort" Atlantic Treat)' Organization (NATO): NATO expanded its 
mission into peace operations in 1992 when it announced first at the Oslo 
NAC its readiness to support «on a case by case basis in accordance with ... 
(its) own procedures» peace operations under the CSCE, and then at lhe 
December Brussels NAC its readiness to support peace operations under 
the UN. Although individual NATO nations have been consistent contribu-
tors to UN observer missions and UN unit deployments, as in UNPROFOR 
in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Somalia, NATO as an 
institution with its integrated military command first became involved in 
UN peace operations in 1992. Operation Deny Flight, the «no-f1y zone» 
enforcement mission over Bosnia-Hercegovina, Operation Sharp Guard, lhe 
Adriatic maritime embargo mission, and potential ground operations in 
Bosnia should a peace agreement be reached, are examples of NATO forces 
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operating under the operational control of a regional Major Subordinate 
Conunand (MSC) - AFSOUTH - fi support of a UN-directed peace opera-
tion. ln addition, N ATO reSOurces fi the form of a mobile headquarters 
from Northem Army Group (NORTHAG) were provided to the UN Bosnia-
-Hercegovina Conunand (BHC) of UNPROFOR. 
NATO's mechanisms relating to peace operations inc\ude: 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC), made up of NATO's 16 nations, 
the higbest decision-making body in the Alliance; 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Counci! (NACC), 38 nations, with its 
Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping; 
the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, currently with 22 signed 
partners, with its training and mission focus on peacekeeping, search 
and rescue and disaster relief; 
NATO's integrated military conunand structure; and 
the Combined loint Task Force (CJTF) initiative, designed to provi-
de a command and control (C') headquarters for NATO out-of-area 
operations, NATOand non-NATO peace operalion coalitions, and Wes-
tem European Union (WEU) led operations with NATO resources. 
A brief assessment of NATO's capability in peace operations would 
suggest tbat first, with the New Strategic Concept's focus on conflict pre-
vention and crisis management, it is ideaUy suited for peace operations as 
a mission; second, with its integrated military command and interoperable 
forces, it is well suited for both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement; third, 
with regard to conunand and control, it is well situated at the operational 
and taclical leveis, but weak at the linkage between the operational and 
strategic leveis where multinational forces, to inc\ude non-NATO, are invol-
ved, and weak at the strategic levei between NATO and the UN and NATO 
and the CSCE. 
d. Western European Union (WEU): The WEU, currently nine member 
states with one potential member (Greece) pending ratification three 
associate membres, tvvo observers, and nine associate partners, is the most 
visible evidence of the concept known as the European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI). The WEU has gained momentum in recent years and is in 
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the process of becoming the de tacto defense arm of, and the eventual imple-
menter of a common defense policy for, the Europcan Union (EU), The 
WEU has had maritime peace-enforcement experience in the Persian Gulf 
War and currently participates in Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic 
under AFSOUTH's operational control as we11 as conducting embargo opera-
tions along the Danube River, Peace operations are a legitimate mission 
flowing from the Maastricht Treaty and accompanying Declaration (Decem-
ber 1991) which stated: «The objective is to develop WEU as a means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Aliance." WEU will act in 
conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Aliance». 
Peacekeeping has been more specifica11y mandated in the Petersberg 
Declara tion of J une 1992. 
WEU mechanisms associated with peace operations inc1ude: 
a modest Planning Staff (some 3040 personnel); 
Associate Partners (9); 
although no in-being forces nor colleetive defense assets, on-ca11 
relationships with member states and the EuroCorps. 
A brief assessment of WEU's eapability for peace operations is that 
first, it is still suffering from a lack of institutional maturity, specifiea11y 
in planning and managing operations; second, it is best suited for disaster 
relief, erisis management and limited peaee-enforcement; third, it must depend 
on NATO for infrastrueture support and a C' meehanism - lhe CJTF head-
quarters; and fourth, the absenee of strategic C'l and a political-military 
planning body impedes effeetive eommalld and control at lhe stratcgic leve!. 
A matrix showing eurrenl membership in CSCE. NACC, PFP, NATO 
and WEU is at enc1osure. 
3. Peace opera/ian coapera/ial1: Abau/ what? ln that pcace operations 
constitute some of the more difficult military operations forces are called 
upon to execute, coopel'atlon presumes a common conceptual underpinning 
and a high degree of coordination if cooperation is to be meaningful and 
contribute to the achievement of comlnonly agreed military and politicaI 
objectives. ln olher words, cooperation implies a lo! more than exhortation 
in communiqués and occasional exercises. Cooperation becomes easy once 
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the hard conceptual thinking and coordination have been achieved, My 
judgment is that we still have a long way to go in the pick and shovel area, 
So what is tI,e substantive menu? Although not ali-inclusive, I would 
submit the following issues as start points if lhe AIliance is serious aboul 
cooperation and coordination wilh otller security structures on peace ope-
rations, 
• Developmellt of the malldate: The developmenl of the mandate or 
mission is the slarl point from which everylhing else f1ows_ Both civilian 
and mililary leadership have an inleresl in ensuring thal politicai objectives 
are clearIy underslood and mUlually agreed, and tllat achievable mililary 
objectives can Ihen be derived with as complete an analysis as is possible 
of resource requiremenls and Ihose conditions defining success, The mission 
is also lhe slarl poinl for civilian agency participalion such as Non-Govern-
mental OrganizalionsjPrivate Volunlary Organizalions (NGOsjPVOs), civil-
-military coordinalion required and lhe appropriale military doctrine appli-
cable lo the conduet of mililary operations, 
• Associated mili/ary doe/ri"e: Doctrine, or lhe concepl of how military 
forces go aboul accomplishing a specific mission, will be derived from lhe 
mandate itself, and doctrine in lum will delermine what military forces do 
and have - that is, organization, equipment, training, exercises and ruIes 
Df engagement. A lot of internationl (UN ,NATO) and national work is 
being done on doctrine related to lhe entire spectrum of peace operations, 
bul doctrine remains the criticai arca where central focus is needed, and I 
speak here of the UN, and where the premium for coordinalion and coope-
ration is exlremely high. 
Divisioll of labor: With lhe mandale and accompanying military 
ductrine mutuaJJy agreed, a division of labor can then be addressed, It is a 
division of jabor first derived fnnctionally in terms of conflict prevention, 
(c,g" FYR of Macedonia), or crisis management, (e,g" Bosnia), or a combi-
nalion of both, If erisis management, is it traditional peaeekeeping (e.g" 
Cyprus), or pence-enforeemenl (e,g" Somalia), and is there a range of civil-
-military netivities (NGOs, PVOs) involved (Cambodia, Somalia)? Secondly, 
the mission ar mandate involves a division Df labor among security structures 
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and among nations within those security structures. The UN and CSCE 
provide observers, fact finders and monitors (conflict prevention); the 
UN, CSCE (potentialIy), NATO and the WEU execute preventive deploy-
ments and peacekeeping (conflict prevention/crisis management); and the 
UN and CSCE (by authorization) and NATO and the WEU (by execution 
execute peace-enforcement. Oivision of labor by function, security structure 
and geographical focus is an important substantive issue requiring coope-
ration. Thus far the international community has seemed to have operated 
more on the axiom of «the more the merrier" with the military left to work 
it out on the ground, than on disciplined analysis and logic. 
Command and Control (C'): Command and contrai, not in lhe nar-
row sense of communications hardware, but in the broader sense of ensuring 
a coordinated multinational eHor! to achieve politicai and related military 
objectives, must focus on four criticai questions relating to the mandate: 
- To what ends? 
- Commanded by whom? 
- With what forces? 
- By what means? 
Any multinational peace operation inevitably experiences the inherent 
tension between national sovereignty and the military principie of unity 
of command. ln both UN-directed and UN-authorized peace operations where 
different security structures are involved (UN, NATO, WEU), unity of 
command will never be achieved. Unity of purpose however, can be achie-
ved and disruptive incidents minimized as long as the mandate and accom-
panying military doctrine are mutually understood and agreed, and wherc 
that understanding and agreement are constantly revalidated if the mission 
is modified ar changed «<mission creep,,) . 
• Exercises: Exercises focused on peace operations are clear1y impor-
tant activities for cooperation and not surprisingly have been highlighted 
in recent Ministerial Comml1niqués. Exercises bl1i1d teamwork, solidarity 
and confidence, and most important, identify interoperability wealmesses 
requiring corrective action to ensure effective prosecution af a peace operation. 
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lt should be remembered. however, that exercises are designed to validate trai· 
ning, and training is derived from the doctrine associaled wilh a particular 
peace operalion. The templation lo exploit politicai and public reIations value 
fram high visibilily exercise. should nol oulslrip the pick and shovel work 
involved in getting the doclrine and training righl in the firsl place. Olher· 
wise we put the cart before the horse and learn bad habits in the offing. 
4. Peace operatio/1 cooperation: IVith IVhom and holV? The previous 
section looked at some of the more important issues involved in peace opera· 
tions which should form the substance of whatever cooperation may occur 
among the four security structures being addressed, This seclion looks aI 
who is cooperaling wilh whom and how is iI being handled . 
• UN and CSCE: As menliooed previously, CSCE is generally recogni· 
zed as a regional organizalion as described in Chapler VIII of lhe UN 
Charler. ArlicIe 53 requires Ihat <<fiO enforcemenl aclion shall be laken 
under regional arrangemenls or by regional agencies wilhoul lhe aulhori· 
zation of lhe Security Couneil".}}, and ArticIe 54 requires regional organi· 
zalions lO keep lhe Security Counci! informed of ali aclivilies relaling lO lhe 
maintenance of internalional peace and security. Consequent1y, cooperation 
between lhe UN and CSCE implies a requiremenl for cIose coordination 
at the Qutset. Also, in the area of crisis prevention. it is incumbent upon 
bOlh organizalions to cooperale closely in lhe provision of observers, facl· 
·finders, monitors and olher missions lo avoid unoecessary duplication 
and expense. CSCE Sanclions Assistance Missions (SAM) eslablished in 1992 
to monilor the implementation of UN·mandated sanctions againsl Serbia 
and Montenegro are a case in point. A brief assessmenl of UN/CSCE coope· 
ration would seem lo indicale thal it is adequate at present, bul one musl 
recognize lha I lhe CSCE is struclurally week and Ihus far is operating 
modestly at the low end of peace operalioos. The requiremenl for 
more aclive coordination and cooperation will dramatically increase, howe· 
ver, with more CSCE <dnstitutionalizatioll>}, CSCE movemenl toward «ope· 
rationalizing}} early warning, conflict prevenlion and crisis management and 
a UN desire lo shed some of the peace operalion burden down lo regional 
organizations. 
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• NATO and WEU: NATO and WEU are entering a new plateau of 
cooperation and coordination stemming from the 1994 Brussels NATO 
Summit. The principIe focus is on giving form and substance to the «separa-
ble but not separate» concept of NATO capabilities and resources being 
used to make ESDI a reality. The CjTF initiative is the instrument - a 
C' headquarters - which can be used by both NATO and lhe WEU, wilh 
NATO members not part aI integrated miJitary command and non-NATO 
participation, to provide either organization the capabiJity to prosecute peace 
operations out-of-area. The NATO military authorities are currentJy working 
the issue in its military dimension; however, the politicaI authorities of 
both NATO and the WEU have yet to fulIy engage at the political-military 
leveI to address lhe related command and control issues at the strategic 
leveI. Issues incJude: developrncnt of politicaI guidance for CJTF C'; the 
creation of policy coordination and crisis management mechanisms at the 
strategic levei which can provide advice to the WEU, coordinate with and 
perform the functions performed by lhe Military Committee, IS!IMS and 
related MNC in NATO's command structure; crcation of a workable thea-
ter headquarters mechanism for lhe WEU at the opcrational leveI to provide 
the bridge between the strategic leveI (WEU) and the tactical levei (CJTF); 
and ensuring lhat organizational and structural modifications designed for 
a CjTF do not erode the integrity of NATO's integrated miJitary command. 
NATO and WEU, as mentioned earlier, are primariJy peace-enforcement 
instruments, and at the operational and tactical leveIs valuable experience 
is currently being gained in Operatiol1 Sharp Guard, even though initial 
efforts in the Adriatic were more competitive than complementary. A brief 
assessment would indicate that cooperation, thoughl '101 adequate aI presento 
is improving. This improvement is clearly helped by participation of NATO 
and WEU Secretary-Generals at each others' MinisteriaIs; sharing products 
emanating from the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping; 
co-Iocation in Brussels of the WEU Secretariat and NATO headquarters; 
and overIapping membership of both organizations as seen in NATO's 
NACC and WEU's Associate Parlners. Nonetheless, it must be remem-
bered that WEU's organizational stmcture is weak, and that its modest 
planning celI is unable to compete on equal terms with NATO's combina-
tion of IS, IMS and SHAPE! ACLANT. AIso, there is a need for recipro-
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city and transparency in terms of the WEU keeping NATO fully informed 
of WEU planning . 
• NATO and UN /CSCE: I chose to combine the UN and CSCE in 
discussing NATO's relationship to both, only because either the UN 01' 
CSCE would more than likely be the authorizing organization of a peace 
operation, and NATO in either case would be the «subcontractol'» 01' exe-
cuting agent, particularly of any peace-enforcement missiono Because the 
CSCE is still trying to find its feet, comments rclating to cooperation bet-
ween NATO and UN/CSCE will in the main focus on the more mature 
relationship with the UN and the experience being developed from opera-
tions in and around the FRY. As I indicated aI the outset, cooperation has 
improved and is adequate at the operational and tactical leveIs in the con-
text of Operation Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and planning for NATO 
ground operalions in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Athough lacking unity of com-
mand, unity of purpose is facililated by parallel hierarchical structures with 
a design for horizontal liaison between the twO. NATO currently has liai-
son offices in DPKO ai UN Headquarters in New York (slrategic levei), 
UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb (operational levei) and BHC ai Sara-
jevo (tactical leveI), with UNPROFOR liaison at the NATO Combined 
Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza. ln essence, NATO's theater 
command (AFSOUTH) ai the operational levei is paraJleled by UNPROFOR, 
and NATO's planned tactical levei CJTF, lhe Allied Command Europe 
Rapid Reaclion Corps (ARRC), is paralleled by BHC. 
Where the cooperation is weakest is at the strategic leveI (Brussels 
and New York) and command and control arrangements between the opera-
lional and strategic leveI. Delays in executing NATO close air suppor! 
missions for UNPROFOR forces were nol due solely to a cumbersome 
command chain, but to basic conceptual disagreement at the strategic levei 
on the use of military force. This conceptual issue has not been resolved - in 
8hort, the mixture of UN-directed «peaceekeepers» and NATO «peace-enfor-
cers» in the sarne tactical context and theater may not be conceptually 01' 
practicaJly sound. Use of coercive military force by an organization inevitably 
makes that organization a co-belligerent in the eyes of other belligerenls, 
and where certain nations provide units for both peace-enforcement and 
peacekeeping, the bel1igerent who is being bombed may lack the sophis-
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tication to distinguish between the two. ln any event, peacekeeping and peace-
-enforcement units are structured and equipped differently, so it is not 
surprising that French and UK lightly armed peacekeeping uni ts in 
UNPROFOR view with some alarm the potential of being in close proxi-
mity to NATO peace-enforcement missions. Related issues include: the 
relationship between the NAC at 16 and the Security Council at 15; and Witll 
NATO in support of a UN-directed peace operation, SHAPE's reiationship 
to the operational levei (AFSOUTH/UNPROFOR) and the strategic levei 
(Brussels/New York). Finally, although recognizing that the UN DPKO 
should be the focal point for peace operation doctrinal and training gui-
dance, NATO needs to be more proactive in sharing with the UN NATO 
experience captured both from the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation 
in Peacekeeping and field operations in FR Y. The UN needs ali the help 
it can get from lessons learned relating to peace operation doctrine, training, 
interoperability and logistic suppor!. That should be a key function of the 
NATO Jiaison office in New York. Much more needs to be done in this 
regard. 
With regard to NATO's cooperation with the CSCE, it is virtually 
non-existent in spite of the rhetoric suggesting otherwise. There are politicai 
minefields to be sure. Some nations are suggesting treaty status for tl,e 
CSCE which could result in a downgrading of NATO's politicai clout, and 
NATO may face potential competition with the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS) as CSCE agent of choise for certain peace operation 
scenarios. Nonetheless, if the promise of «operationalizing» CSCE's capa-
bilities for early warning, conflict preventio11 and crisis management is in 
any way met, NATO's cooperation and coordination with CSCE will have 
to be dramatically improved. 
5. Summary: An assessment of cooperation in peace operations among the 
UN, CSCE, NATO and the WEU yields a mixed review. There is both 
good news and bad news, and the overarching conc1usion is that the current 
communiqué rhetoric is not matched by reality 011 the ground. General 
conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
• Both the CSCE and the WEU are still weak in institutional struclure; 
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hence the mechanisms (e,g" planning staffs) for meaningful coope-
ration are not well developed; 
ln an operational and tactical context, NATO and the WEU are 
improving their cooperation, but much work remains to be accom-
plished at the strategic and political-military leveI with command 
and control arrangements, Work done by the NACC Ad Hoc Group 
on Cooperation in Peacekeeping is valuable to spreading lessons 
learned between the NACC/PFP and WEU with its Associate Par-
tners, NATO is weakest in its cooperation with the UN and CSCE 
with regard to command and control at the strategic levei as well 
as establishing an agenda for rationalized UN guidance on doctrine, 
training, interoperability, logistic support and exercises applicable to 
UN, CSCE, NATO and WEU peace operations, ln an operational 
context (operational and tactical leveIs) NATO's cooperation with 
the UN is adequate and improving, although more work needs to 
be done with the command and control linkage between the opera-
tional and strategic leveIs (AFSOUTH/UNPROFOR vs, BrusseIs/ 
/New Y ork) , Much more conceptual work is needed between Brus-
seIs and New York on the role of force in peace operations, and 
the compatibility of peace-enforcement with UN-directed peace opera-
tions, Le., the mixing af «peacekeepers» and «peace~enforcers» in 
the sarne tacticaI context. A major effort needs to be launched by 
NATO with regard to cooperation with the CSCE, particuIarly when 
CSCE strategic warning, conflict prevention and crisis management 
capabilities become more operational; 
As NATO moves to increase its cooperation with the WEU and 
CSCE, it needs to be mindful of two potential Trojan Horses, First, 
as new procedures and struetures are developed to support the 
CJTF concept and give substance to «separable but not separate» 
capabilities, care must be taken to protect the integrity and effecti-
veness of NATO's integrated military command (a unique asse!) 
with ali that implies in terms of interoperable doctrine, tchniques 
and procedures, Second, as NATO contributes to «operationalizing» 
CSCE's capabilities in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis 
management, it should realize that it is imparting to CSCE just lhose 
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capabilities that make NATO unique. ln its enthusiasm to cooperate, 
NATO must be careful lest it undermine its own institutional rele-
vance. Cooperation in digging one's own grave is a dubious enterprise 
at best. 
CSCE NACC PFP NATO WEU 
United States x x x x 
Canada x x x x 
Belgium x x x x x 
France x x x x x 
Germany x x x x x 
!taly x x x x x 
Luxembourg x x x x x 
Netherlands x x x x x 
Portugal x x x x x 
SpaÍD x x x x x 
United Kingdol11 x x x x x 
Greece x x x x r 
Denmark x x x x o 
lceland x x x x a 
Norway x x x x u 
Turkey x x x x a 
Austria x I') 
Finland x o x 
Ireland x o 
Sweden x (') x 
Switzcrland x 
Albania x x x 
Bulgaria x x x b 
Czcch Republk x x x b 
Hungary x x x b 
Poland x x x b 
Slovakia x x x b 
Rornania x x x b 
Estania x x x b 
Latvia x x x b 
Lithllania x x x b 
Russio x x x 
Ukrainc x x x 
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CSCE NACC PFP NATO WEU 
Belarus x x 
Moldava x x x 
Armenia x x 
Azerbaijan x x x 
Georgia x x x 
Kazakhstan x x x 
Turkmenistan x x x 
Uzbekistan x x x 
Kygyzstan x x x 
Tajikistan x x 
B05ma & Hercegovina x 
Croatia x 
F.Y.R. af Macedonia o 
SloveniB x x 
Yugoslavía s 
Others f) x 
TOTALS (not including 53 38 38 16 22 
observer:s) 
Symbols 
;!(=memher 
a = ruisociate member 
b = associate partner 
o=observer 
r = ratification pending 
s = suspended 
e) Austria and Sweden are not members af NACC. bUl, thogether with Finlancl 
which has observer status 1n NACC, participate in tbe NACC Ad Hoc Group OD Cooperation 
in Peacekeeping. 
e) Other statcs include Cyprus, Holy Sec, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco. and San Marino. 
John O. B. Sewall 
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